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Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 110 P.3d 1058 (2005)1 
 
EVIDENCE – REBUTTING CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
This case involves allegations regarding fraudulent use of a credit card and 
identity theft.  Appellant Michael Jezdik (“Jezdik”) and the victim in this case, Anna 
Behran (“Behran”), met in Las Vegas in early 1997.  They enjoyed a brief romantic 
relationship but soon parted ways.  Approximately three years later, however, Jezdik and 
Behran rekindled their friendship. 
 Behran told Jezdik that she wanted to purchase a home but did not know how to 
do so.  Jezdik offered to help Behran complete an online mortgage application at his 
residence.  Behran agreed.  Throughout the mortgage applicatiosn process, Jezdik 
acquired access to Behran’s social security number and other confidential information.   
 Approximately one month after Jezdik assisted Behran with her mortgage 
application, Citibank received an online application for a MasterCard naming Behran as 
the primary cardholder and Jezdik as the secondary cardholder.  As the primary 
cardholder, the credit card application required Behran’s social security number and date 
of birth.  The application, however, provided Jezdik’s address and stated that Behran was 
employed by Southwest Advertising, Jezdik’s employer.  At trial, Behran denied any 
responsibility for the credit card application.  She also testified that she never authorized 
Jezdik to use her personal information to apply for a credit card, never used Jezdik’s 
address to receive mail, and never worked for Southwest Advertising. 
 Citibank approved the application and sent two cards to Jezdik’s address.  
Citibank’s statements went unpaid.  Upon discovering the credit card account in her 
name, Behran testified that she directed Citibank to close the account.  As part of the 
ensuing fraud investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Detective John 
Woosnam (“Woosnam”) contacted Citibank and learned that Citibank lost money on the 
account.  Woosnam obtained copies of three credit card receipts and billing statements 
revealing seventeen purchases made during a two-week period.  At trial, Woosnam made 
a lay comparison of Jezdik’s signature on a copy of a voluntary statement with the 
signature on the Citibank receipts.  While not an expert, Woosnam testified that in his 
opinion, the signatures were the same.2 
 At trial, Jezdik theorized that Behran opened the credit card account and used his 
address and computer to complete the application in his absence.  Jezdik testified that he 
and Behran had renewed their romantic relationship and that Behran had complete access 
to his residence.  Additionally, Jezdik testified that he and Behran were indeed coworkers 
at Southwest Advertising. 
 In an attempt to establish Jezdik’s credibility and good character, Jezdik’s 
attorney asked him during direct examination “Have you ever been accused of anything 
                                                 
1 By Brian Reeve 
2 Although Jezdik contends on appeal that the district court’s admission of lay witness testimony 
concerning handwriting comparisons was improper, the court declined to reach the issue. 
prior to these current charges?”3  Jezdik answered “No.”  Later, in the jury’s absence, the 
State argued that Jezdik’s “no accusation” testimony “opened the door” to specific 
rebuttal evidence regarding misconduct similar to that alleged in this case.4  The district 
court agreed with the state and allowed two rebuttal witnesses to testify.  A Detective 
Olewinski testified regarding an unrelated ongoing investigation of Jezdik.  The other 
witness was Jezdik’s father-in-law, who testified that Jezdik once admitted to using his 
personal information to open a credit card account without his knowledge or consent. 
 The jury found Jezdik guilty on one count of obtaining and using the personal 
identification of another, three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and two counts of 
burglary.   Jezdik appealed.  On appeal Jezdik contends that Detective Olewinski’s and 
his father-in-law’s testimony constitutes improper character evidence under NRS 48.045 
and inappropriate impeachment evidence under NRS 50.085.  The State argues, however, 
that neither NRS 48.045 nor NRS 50.085 applies because the State elicited the testimony 
to rebut Jezdik’s own testimony on direct examination. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue: The main issue on appeal is “the extent to which the State may rebut character 
evidence introduced by the defendant in a criminal case.” 
 
Disposition: The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that that district court properly 
admitted the State’s rebuttal evidence in response to Jezdik’s improper character 
evidence during defense counsel’s direct examination of Jezdik. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Jezdik 
 
 Character Evidence Generally 
 
 NRS 48.045(1) governs the admissibility of character evidence in a criminal trial: 
 
 1. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
 (a)  Evidence of his character or a trait of his character offered by an 
accused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut such evidence . . 
. 5 
 
Accordingly, NRS 48.045(1)(a) allows the defendant solely to decide whether to place 
his character in issue.   
NRS 48.055 provides the means for proving character under NRS 48.045.  It 
states, “In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is 
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4 Id. at 1062. 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. 48.045 (2004) (emphasis added). 
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion.  
On cross-examination, inquiry may be made into specific instances of conduct.”6 
 Generally, when a defendant elects to introduce character evidence in the form of 
either reputation or opinion evidence, the State is correspondingly limited in its rebuttal 
evidence and may only ask about specific acts on cross examination.  That is not what 
happened in this case.  Here, Jezdik did not introduce evidence regarding his own 
character in the form of reputation or opinion evidence.  Instead, Jezdik put his character 
in issue by testifying that he had never been “accused of anything prior to these current 
charges.”7  Jezdik’s statement essentially denied any prior specific instances of conduct. 
 
 The “Collateral Fact Rule” and Attacking Credibility 
 
 Under the “collateral fact rule” it is improper to allow “the State to impeach a 
defendant’s credibility with extrinsic evidence relating to a collateral matter.”8  Collateral 
facts are facts that are “outside the controversy, or are not directly connected with the 
principal matter or issue in dispute.”9  Notwithstanding these common law rules, under 
NRS 50,085(3), collateral matters may be used to impeach a witness during cross 
examination “with questions about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to 
truthfulness or untruthfulness and no extrinsic evidence is used.”10 
 The court noted that the collateral fact rule is limited in its application.  For 
example, the rule does not control the scope of cross-examination.  An examiner may still 
question a witness any aspect of the witness’s direct testimony.  Accordingly, the 
collateral fact rule’s main proscription applies when “the witness to be impeached has 
already left the stand and the former cross-examiner later calls a second witness or 
proffers an exhibit to impeach the earlier witness’s credibility.”11  Consequently, the 
collateral fact rule does not apply to a majority of methods of impeachment including 
attacks on a witness’s motive for testifying and impeachment using criminal convictions.  
It does apply, however, “when a specific contradiction is coupled with impeachment by a 
prior inconsistent statement or impeachment using extrinsic prior bad acts not resulting in 
a conviction.”12 
 Based on the foregoing, a specific contradiction using extrinsic evidence of a 
prior bad act generally triggers the collateral fact rule in NRS 50.085(3).  Yet, some 
authorities have advocated an exception to the collateral fact rule when the State “seeks 
to introduce evidence on rebuttal to contradict specific factual assertions raised during the 
accused’s direct examination.”13  This exception, called the “specific contradiction” 
exception, provides that a defendant’s false statements during direct examination “open 
the door” to the admissibility of remedial specific contradiction evidence.14   
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14 Id. 
State of the Law After Jezdik 
 
 Before this case, the Nevada Supreme Court had not explicitly adopted the 
“specific contradiction” exception.  The court expressly adopted the exception in Jezdik.  
As a result, Nevada’s statutory rules of evidence are interpreted to mean that a party is 
not prohibited from introducing extrinsic evidence that specifically rebuts an adversary’s 
proffered evidence of good character.   
 One question that remains unanswered after Jezdik is what type of factual 
assertions “open the door” to the admissibility of specific contradictory evidence?  How 
much leniency are courts willing to grant a witness during his or her testimony before the 
witness has “opened the door” to the opposing party’s use of extrinsic evidence?  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court correctly allowed the State to specifically rebut Jezdik’s denial 
of previous accusations on direct examination under the specific contradiction exception 
to the collateral fact rule. 
  
 
 
